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1. Introduction 
In everyday conversation, sentence meanings are not always expressed explicitly, 
but can also be merely implied. For example, consider the following sentence: 
 
(1) Some elephants have trunks. 
Taken literally, this sentence is true because in the present world elephants 
generally have trunks. From this it logically follows that at least some elephants 
have trunks. However, many people would consider this sentence false. For 
them, it would be more appropriate to use the quantifier all instead of some. 
According to standard pragmatic views, if the speaker uses the underinformative 
or weak form on a scale of informativeness, the listener may assume that the 
speaker is not in a position to use the informative or strong form on the same 
scale (Grice 1975). Thus, using the weak form some indicates that the strong 
form all is not applicable here. This leads a listener to interpret (1) as meaning 
that not all elephants have trunks. This inference is called a scalar implicature. 
Because the implicature is not true in the present world, many people judge (1) 
to be false. Scalar implicatures can be derived on the basis of a variety of scales. 
In (1), the relevant scale of informativeness is <some, all>. Other scales are <or, 
and>, <sometimes, always>, and <may, must>. A characteristic of these scales is 
that their elements are ordered by entailment relations. Elements on the right side 
of the scale are informationally stronger, and therefore logically entail the 
weaker ones.  
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 Recently, several studies have experimentally investigated the ability of 
adults and children to compute scalar implicatures. These studies reveal that 
children compute fewer implicatures than adults do (e.g., Noveck 2001), and 
hence are said to be more logical than adults, although even adults do not 
compute implicatures in all cases. Furthermore, it is shown that children’s 
performance improves when the experimental conditions are manipulated 
(Guasti et al. 2005; Papafragou & Musolino 2003; Pouscoulous et al. 2007), 
suggesting that cognitive resources may be a factor in children’s limited ability 
to compute scalar implicatures. In line with this view, it has been argued that the 
observed variation among adults is caused by differences in working memory 
capacity as well (Feeney et al. 2004).  
In this article, we discuss two experiments investigating the computation of 
scalar implicatures by Dutch adults. The aim of the experiments is to shed more 
light on the observed variation among individuals and across studies. 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Introduction 
If limited working memory capacity is responsible for children’s generally lower 
rate of implicatures as well as for the observed variation among adults, it is 
expected that working memory capacity correlates with rate of implicatures in 
adults. We tested this in an experiment with Dutch adults. 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
Seventy-three adult native speakers of Dutch (age range 18-29; mean age 23;7) 
participated in this study: 19 with low working memory capacity, 39 with middle 
working memory capacity and 15 with high working memory capacity. Working 
memory capacity was assessed before the actual experiment took place (see 
below). Most participants were university students, who participated voluntary. 
None of the participants had (a history of) neurological, auditive or visual 
problems. 
2.2.2. Materials and procedure 
To investigate the verbal working memory capacities of the participants, we 
tested participants on the reading span task of Van den Noort et al. (2008), which 
is a Dutch version of Daneman and Carpenter (1980). This task required 
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participants to read aloud series of sentences, increasing in length from 2 to 6 
sentences, while trying to remember the last word of each sentence. At the end of 
the series of sentences, participants had to repeat back these words in the correct 
order. Participants were categorized as high-, middle- or low-spanners according 
to the criteria in Van den Noort et al. After the working memory test, the middle-
spanners (but not the participants who were categorized as low-spanners or high-
spanners) did a pre-test task (a verbal reasoning task) which is not relevant for 
the present discussion.  
 Following the working memory task (for all participants) and the pre-test 
task (for middle-spanners only), all participants took part in the actual 
experiment, an auditory Truth-Value Judgment Task. This task required 
participants to judge whether a given statement is true or false. Three 
experimental factors were included, namely Situation Type (an ‘all’ situation that 
makes the proposition true in all cases, versus a ‘subset’ situation that makes the 
proposition true in only a subset of the cases), Scale (determiner scale <sommige, 
alle> versus adverb scale <soms, altijd>) and Strength (strong versus weak term 
on a scale). These factors resulted in the following types of statements (in their 
English translations): 
 
‘All’ situation      ‘Subset’ situation 
(2) All fridges have doors.   (6) All children are blonde. 
(3) Some elephants have trunks.  (7) Some books have pictures. 
(4) Airplanes always have wings.  (8) Flowers always are yellow. 
(5) Giraffes sometimes have long  (9) Birds sometimes live in cages. 
 necks. 
 
The statements in (3) and (5) are underinformative, as they are true in all 
situations but contain the weak term on the scale. Hence, they may be considered 
infelicitous. The response on these statements depends on whether the 
participants compute an implicature or not. If participants do not compute an 
implicature, they are expected to judge these statements to be true. If they 
compute an implicature, they are expected to judge these statements to be false.  
Participants received 24 test sentences, which were adapted from Feeney et 
al. (2004), whose test sentences are a subset of Noveck’s (2001) materials. For 
each of the 8 conditions above, 2 statements were included. In addition, 8 absurd 
statements were included, balancing ‘true’ versus ‘false’ responses (2 for each 
scalar term, e.g., Some birds have telephones). Furthermore, participants received 
12 filler items containing a negation (6 true, 6 false): 6 of them contained the 
sentential negation geen (‘no’), and 6 contained the sentential negation nooit 
(‘never’). In total, therefore, each participant received 36 statements. 
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 Each test sentence was presented with both sommige (‘some’) and alle 
(‘all’), although each participant received only one of the two items. The same 
holds for the test sentences with soms (‘sometimes’) and altijd (‘always’). The 
same 12 filler items were presented to each participant. This resulted in two 
versions of the materials. For each of these versions two random orders were 
prepared to control for order effects, resulting in a total of four lists. The test 
sentences were pre-recorded and were produced by a woman with a neutral 
accent who did not have any knowledge of the goal of the experiment. Sentences 
were presented at a regular speed, with an interval of three seconds separating 
the sentences. Participants had to say “true” or “false” to the statement, after 
which the experimenter wrote down their response. Each test session started with 
two practice items (one true, one false) to familiarize participants with the 
experiment.  
2.3. Results 
 
The mean percentages of logical responses on underinformative statements with 
sommige and soms (cf. (3) and (5)) versus informative statements with these 
terms (cf. (7) and (9)) are graphically presented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Percentages of logical responses for the scalar terms ‘sommige’ and 
‘soms’ in underinformative versus informative statements. The error bars 
indicate one standard deviation from the average. 
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General Linear Model Repeated Measures ANOVA test statistics were run on 
these logical response percentages with Situation Type (‘all’ situation versus 
‘subset’ situation), Scale (determiner versus adverb), and Strength (strong versus 
weak) as within-participants factors and Span (low versus middle versus high) as 
a between-subjects factor. For the participants with middle verbal working 
memory span, Pre-test Task was a between-subjects factor as well. 
The main effect of Scale is significant, F(1,70) = 11.552, p = .001. The 
determiner scale elicited more ‘true’ responses than the adverb scale. 
Furthermore, the main effect of Strength is significant, F(1,70) = 78.965, p < 
.001. The statements containing strong scalar terms elicited a higher number of 
‘true’ responses than the statements containing weak scalar terms. The main 
effect of Situation Type is also significant, F(1,70) = 134.852, p = <.001. 
Statements about ‘all’  situations elicited more ‘true’ responses than statements 
about ‘subset’ situations. The interaction between Scale x Strength is significant, 
F(1,70) = 6.751, p = .011. The adverb scale elicited a higher number of ‘true’ 
responses than the determiner scale, except for statements about ‘all’ situations. 
For these statements, the determiner scale elicited more ‘true’ responses. The 
interaction between Scale x Situation Type is significant, F(1,70) = 5.989, p = 
.017. The adverb statements about ‘all’ situations elicited a lower number of 
‘true’ responses than the other conditions. The interaction between Strength x 
Situation Type is significant, F(1,70) = 75.902, p < .001. The statements about 
‘all’ situations that contain a weak determiner elicited a lower number of ‘true’ 
responses than the other conditions. The interaction between Scale x Strength x 
Situation Type is significant, F(1,70) = 4.773, p = .032. The statements about 
‘all’ situations that contain the weak adverb elicited fewer ‘true’ responses than 
the other conditions. The interaction between Scale x Pre-test Task is not 
significant, F(1,37)= 1.650, p = .207, neither is the interaction between Strength 
x Pre-test Task, F(1,37)= 0.478, p = .494, nor is the interaction between Situation 
Type x Pre-test Task, F(1,37)= 0.855, p = .361. The interaction between Scale x 
Strength x Pre-test Task is not significant, F(1,37)= 0.819, p = .371, neither is the 
interaction between Scale x Situation Type x Pre-test Task , F(1,37)= 1.121, p = 
.297, nor is the interaction between Strength x Situation Type x Pre-test Task, 
F(1,37)= 2.026, p = .163. The interaction between Pre-test Task x Scale x 
Strength x Situation Type is not significant, F(1,37)= 0.017, p = .896. Because 
no effect of the factor Pre-test Task was found, the middle-spanners can be 
compared with the low-spanners and the high-spanners, who did not receive a 
pre-test task. The interaction between Scale x Span is not significant, F(2,70) = 
2.063, p = .135, neither is the interaction between Strength x Span, F(2,70) = 
0.485, p = .618, nor is the interaction between Situation Type x Span, F(2,70) = 
1.552, p = .219. The interaction between Scale x Strength x Span is not 
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significant, F(2,70) = 1.995, p = .144, neither is the interaction between Scale x 
Situation Type x Span, F(2,70) = 3.026, p = .055, nor is the interaction between 
Strength x Situation Type x Span, F(2,70) = 0.189, p = .828. The interaction 
between Scale x Strength x Situation Type x Span is not significant, F(2,70) = 
0.586, p = 0.559. 
2.4. Discussion 
Informative statements with sommige (‘some’) and soms (‘sometimes’) were 
judged to be true in almost 100% of the cases (see Figure 1), whereas 
underinformative statements with these scalar terms were judged to be true 
significantly less often. The rejections of underinformative statements indicate 
that adult speakers of Dutch compute implicatures with sommige and soms, and 
frequently interpret these items as meaning ‘some but not all’ and ‘sometimes but 
not always’, respectively. 
 No significant effects of working memory capacity were found. With 
sommige and soms, low-spanners gave pragmatic (implicature) responses only 
(n=6 for sommige/n=11 for soms), mixed responses (n=5/n=4) as well as logical 
responses only (n=8/n=4). The same variation was observed among middle-
spanners (pragmatic responses only: n=8/n=20; mixed responses: n=12/n=8;  
logical responses only: n=20/n=12) and high-spanners (pragmatic responses 
only: n=6/n=7; mixed responses: n=4/n=2; logical responses only: n=5/n=6). So 
even though adults did not compute implicatures in all cases, adults with a low 
working memory span did not compute implicatures at a significantly different 
rate than adults with a high working memory span. Thus, our results disconfirm 
the conclusions of Feeney et al. (2004) that working memory capacity has an 
effect on implicature computation.  
 On average, participants gave logical responses with sommige in 58.8% of 
the cases and with soms in 39.2% of the cases, corresponding to a rate of 
implicatures of 41.2% with sommige and 60.8% with soms. This difference is 
significant, and suggests that particular properties of the scalar term or the 
sentence containing the scalar term may be responsible for the different rate of 
implicatures. One possibility is that the difference between responses on 
statements with sommige and soms does not really reflect a difference in 
implicature computation, but rather is caused by a generic interpretation of the 
statements with soms. If a sentence such as Giraffes sometimes have long necks 
is assigned a generic interpretation (meaning that giraffes have long necks on 
certain days but have short necks on other days), participants are expected to 
answer ‘false’ too, just as when they compute an implicature. This will result in a 
higher rate of ‘false’ responses with soms than with sommige. An alternative 
Some implicatures reveal semantic differences   7 
explanation for the higher rate of ‘true’ responses with sommige than with soms 
is that this is caused by particular properties of the scalar term sommige. In a 
second experiment, we investigate this latter possibility. 
3. Experiment 2 
3.1. Introduction 
Might the rate of implicatures be dependent on the scalar term involved? In an 
experiment with French children and adults, Pouscoulous et al. (2007) 
investigated the availability of implicatures with the French scalar terms certains 
and quelques, both meaning ‘some’. Pouscoulous et al. assume that quelques is 
easier to process than certains. As evidence for this assumption, they point at a 
series of observations showing that certains is less frequent than quelques in 
children’s written production, children’s books and adult language, and that 
young children understand quelques more readily than certains. Indeed, they find 
that children, but not adults, compute more implicatures with quelques than with 
certains. Pouscoulous et al. attribute this difference in implicature computation 
to the lexical complexity of certains. Because certains receives a partitive 
interpretation, it is harder to interpret, they claim. As a consequence, children 
have fewer resources left to compute the implicature. In contrast, the adults in 
their experiment “have enough resources available to appear unaffected by our 
choice of word” (p. 370). 
 Like French, Dutch also has several terms to express existential 
quantification. It is not unusual to translate English some with Dutch sommige. 
However, Dutch also has the form enkele. According to De Jong (1983), 
sommige gives rise to a presupposition (sommige wel ‘some do’ implies andere 
niet ‘others don’t’), whereas enkele can also be used non-presuppositionally. The 
presupposition of sommige follows from its partitive interpretation (‘a part of 
the’), she claims. As such, sommige is equivalent to the partitive construction 
enkele van de (‘some of the’). This explains why sommige and enkele van de 
cannot appear in the following existential sentence, whereas enkele can: 
 
(10) Er liggen enkele/*sommige/*enkele van de bunkers in het duingebied. 
 There lie some (of the) bunkers in the dune-area 
 
De Hoop and Kas (1989; see also De Hoop 1992), on the other hand, argue that 
sommige differs from enkele, not because sommige is presuppositional, but 
because sommige is not a purely quantitative determiner. Sommige refers to a 
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certain subset of the set referred to by the noun. The meaning of sommige is such 
that the members of this subset must be related to each other by an implicit or 
explicit property. In the sentence Sommige katten zijn doof (‘some cats are 
deaf’), the set of cats that are deaf must have some property in common, for 
example the property that they are white. Because of this non-quantitative aspect 
of its meaning, sommige cannot appear in existential sentences. The 
unacceptability of enkele van de in (10) has a different explanation, according to 
De Hoop and Kas: morphosyntactic partitivity implies the existence of a finite 
set, which is not given in (10). 
 Scalar and other conversational implicatures have been argued to be non-
detachable: every expression with the same meaning carries the same implicature 
(Grice 1975:39). This property of implicatures can be exploited to investigate the 
existence of subtle meaning differences between lexical items. If De Jong is 
correct in her claim that sommige and enkele van de carry the same meaning, we 
expect to find the same rate of implicatures with sommige and enkele van de. 
Furthermore, these terms may give rise to a different rate of implicatures 
compared to enkele, leading to more implicatures for sommige and enkele van de 
if a partitive interpretation indeed raises the salience of the larger set and 
therefore makes it easier for adults to compute the implicature (cf. Pouscoulous 
et al. 2007:360). On the other hand, if De Hoop and Kas are right, we may see a 
different rate of ‘true’ responses with sommige compared to enkele, because 
sommige is not a purely quantitative determiner. De Hoop and Kas (1989:47) 
propose that the truth conditions of sommige include both quantitative and 
qualitative requirements. Because of the quantitative requirement that the subset 
referred to by sommige must have at least one member, sommige might be able to 
evoke a scale <sommige, alle> and hence give rise to an implicature. However, 
in addition to this quantitative requirement, sommige is also argued to be subject 
to the qualitative requirement that the members of the subset selected by 
sommige must have an implicit or explicit property in common. This qualitative 
requirement may have different effects: it is conceivable that participants reject 
underinformative statements with sommige like Sommige boeken hebben 
bladzijden (‘some books have pages’) because they fail to identify such a 
property. In this case, we expect responses resembling those associated with the 
computation of an implicature. Alternatively, participants may succeed in finding 
a common property defining a subset even for what we consider to be ‘all’ 
situations (e.g., the property of being made of paper rather than being digital, 
when talking about the subset of books that have pages). In that case, there is no 
need to compute an implicature and we expect a logical response. Consequently, 
we may see either fewer or more ‘true’ responses with sommige than with enkele. 
A further prediction is that under De Hoop and Kas’ account we do not expect 
any differences in the rate of implicatures between partitive and non-partitive 
Some implicatures reveal semantic differences   9 
constructions, because morphosyntactic partitivity does not affect the 
quantitative properties of scalar terms. We tested these predictions in an 
experiment similar to Experiment 1. 
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants 
Thirty-two adult native speakers of Dutch (age range 20-36, mean age 27;2) 
participated in this experiment. The participants in Experiment 2 were university 
students who had not participated in Experiment 1. None of them had (a history 
of) neurological, auditive or visual problems. 
3.2.2. Materials and procedure 
Experiment 2 consisted of a Truth-Value Judgment Task. No pre-test tasks were 
administered. The experiment included three factors, namely Situation Type (‘all’ 
situation versus ‘subset’ situation), Scalar Term (sommige (‘some’) versus enkele 
(‘some’)) and Partitivity (with versus without the partitive construction van de 
(‘of the’)), resulting in the following types of statements: 
 
‘All’ situation 
(11) Enkele olifanten hebben slurven. (‘some elephants have trunks’) 
(12) Sommige boeken hebben bladzijden. (‘some books have pages’) 
(13) Enkele van de giraffen hebben lange nekken. (‘some of the giraffes have 
long necks’) 
(14) Sommige van de katten hebben oren. (‘some of the cats have ears’) 
 
‘Subset’ situation 
(15) Enkele boeken hebben plaatjes. (‘some books have pictures’) 
(16) Sommige vogels leven in kooien. (‘some birds live in cages’) 
(17) Enkele van de bloemen zijn geel. (‘some of the flowers are yellow’) 
(18) Sommige van de jurken hebben ritsen. (‘some of the dresses have zips’) 
 
Participants received a total of 48 statements, 16 of which were test items and 32 
were filler items. The 16 test items consisted of 2 statements for each of the 8 
conditions above. Of the 32 filler items, 16 contained the universal quantifier 
alle (‘all’) and 16 contained the negative determiner geen enkele (‘not any’). No 
absurd statements were included. Four versions of the experiment were 
constructed by a Latin square design, so that each version contained two items of 
each condition and one version of each item. The fillers were the same for each 
version of the test. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. 
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3.3. Results 
The mean percentages of logical responses with the four scalar terms are 
graphically presented in Figure 2.  
 
15.5
25.5
12.5
25.5
95.5 95.598.592.0
0
20
40
60
80
100
enkele enkele van
de
s ommige s ommige
van de
L
o
g
ic
al
 / 
 T
ru
e 
re
sp
o
n
se
s 
(%
)
Underinformative
Informative
Figure 2: Percentages of logical responses for four scalar terms in Dutch 
meaning ‘some’, in underinformative versus informative statements. The error 
bars indicate one standard deviation from the average. 
 
General Linear Model Repeated Measures ANOVA test statistics were run on the 
percentages of ‘true’ responses, with Situation Type (‘all’ versus ‘subset’ 
situation), Scalar Term (sommige (‘some’) versus enkele (‘some’)), and 
Partitivity (with versus without the partitive construction van de (‘of the’)) as 
within-participants factors. The main effect of Scalar Term is significant, F(1,31) 
= 9.266, p = .005. The scalar term sommige elicited more ‘true’ responses than 
the scalar term enkele. The main effect of Partitivity is not significant, F(1,31) = 
1.130, p = .296. The main effect of Situation Type is significant, F(1,31) = 
246.559, p  <.001. Statements about ‘all’ situations elicited more ‘true’ responses 
than statements about ‘subset’ situations. The interaction between Scalar Term x 
Partitivity is not significant, F(1,31) = 0.088, p = .768, neither is the interaction 
between Scalar Term x Situation Type, F(1,31) = 2.627, p = .115, nor is the 
interaction between Partitivity x Situation Type, F(1,31) = 0.018, p = .745. The 
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three-way interaction between Scalar Term x Partitivity x Situation Type is also 
not significant, F(1,31) = 0.081, p = .778. 
3.4. Discussion 
Statements with enkele (‘some’) gave rise to significantly more ‘false’ responses 
(indicating an implicature) than statements with sommige (‘some’). The presence 
or absence of a partitive construction, in contrast, had no effect on the rate of 
‘false’ responses; enkele van de/sommige van de did not result in more or fewer 
‘false’ responses than enkele/sommige. 
These results are compatible with the predictions generated on the basis of 
the analysis of De Hoop and Kas (1989) of the semantic difference between 
sommige and enkele, but seem unexplainable from the analysis of De Jong 
(1983). Thus, the results of Experiment 2 provide independent evidence that 
sommige (van de) and enkele (van de) differ semantically. The lower rate of 
‘false’ responses with sommige compared to enkele is explained by the fact that 
sommige is not a purely quantitative determiner but requires that the members of 
the set referred to share a particular property. From our experimental results, we 
are unable to determine why participants accepted or rejected statements with 
sommige. It is possible that for some of the underinformative statements with 
sommige participants were able to identify a relevant property, accepting these 
statements without computing an implicature. For the other underinformative 
statements, participants may have failed to identify a relevant property, rejecting 
these statements without computing an implicature. However, we cannot entirely 
rule out the possibility that participants simply ignored the qualitative 
requirement for sommige and did compute an implicature, although for some 
reason at a lower rate than with enkele.  
If French certains resembles Dutch sommige, qualitative aspects of the 
meaning of certains may also yield an explanation for children’s higher rate of 
errors with certains compared to quelques in the study of Pouscoulous et al. 
(2007). Note that Pouscoulous et al.’s explanation in terms of partitivity (which 
is similar to De Jong’s account) would not be able to explain our results. 
 The different behaviour of sommige (‘some’) and soms (‘sometimes’) in 
Experiment 1 is also explainable from the partly qualitative nature of sommige. 
Because soms does not require that the members of the subset it selects are 
related to each other by a particular property, soms is expected to behave more 
like enkele than like sommige. Indeed, soms in Experiment 1 gave rise to more 
‘false’  responses than sommige, analogous to enkele in Experiment 2. 
In Experiment 2, enkele and sommige in partitive constructions led to ‘false’ 
(implicature-like) responses only (n=26 for enkele/n=21 for sommige), mixed 
responses (n=4/n=6) as well as ‘true’ (logical) responses only (n=2/n=5). Enkele 
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and sommige in non-partitive constructions also led to ‘false’ responses only 
(n=25/n=20), mixed responses (n=4/n=8) as well as ‘true’ responses only 
(n=3/n=4). So in Experiment 1 as well as in Experiment 2, individual variation 
was observed both between and within participants.  
 Although Experiment 1 and 2 were highly similar, participants gave ‘true’ 
answers with sommige in 58.8% of the cases in Experiment 1, but in only 25.0% 
of the cases in Experiment 2. Apart from the different scalar terms used and the 
presence of pre-test tasks in Experiment 1, the main difference between the two 
experiments lies in the filler items used. Using absurd filler items (as we did in 
Experiment 1, following Feeney et al. 2004, and Noveck 2001) may have caused 
the participants to be more tolerant towards underinformative statements with 
sommige, thus suspending the need to either identify the relevant property or 
compute an implicature. Pouscoulous et al. (2007) already emphasized the 
importance of the presence or absence of filler (or, in their terminology, 
distractor) items for children’s computation of implicatures. Our results with 
adults suggest that also the nature of the filler items is important. 
4. Conclusion 
 
We carried out two experiments investigating the influence of working memory 
capacity and semantic properties of the scalar terms on the computation of scalar 
implicatures by Dutch adults. In Experiment 1, we found substantial individual 
variation among adult participants: some participants computed implicatures in 
all cases, whereas others gave mixed responses or logical responses only. 
However, we did not find any evidence for the influence of working memory 
capacity on the rate of implicatures. We did find an effect of scalar term, with 
soms (‘sometimes’) giving rise to more implicature-like responses than sommige 
(‘some’). This result led us to perform a second experiment. In Experiment 2, we 
found that the purely quantitative determiner enkele (‘some’) gave rise to more 
implicature-like responses than the partly qualitative determiner sommige 
(‘some’), suggesting that semantic differences between scalar terms affect the 
computation of implicatures in adults. Morphosyntactic partitivity, on the other 
hand, did not affect the computation of implicatures. Thus, subtle semantic 
differences between scalar terms may be responsible for part of the observed 
variation across studies. However, the particular choice of filler items may have 
an even larger effect. This latter conclusion is supported by the highly different 
results we found for the same test items involving sommige in Experiment 1 and 
2.  
Some implicatures reveal semantic differences   13 
Acknowledgments 
 
This investigation was supported in part by a grant from the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research, NWO, awarded to Petra Hendriks (grant 
no. 277-70-005). We thank Kirsten Bot for her help in running the first 
experiment, and John Hoeks, the audience at the TIN-dag 2009 in Utrecht and 
two anonymous reviewers for useful comments. 
References 
 
Daneman, M. & P. A. Carpenter. 1980. “Individual differences in working memory and 
reading”. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 19. 450-466. 
Feeney, A., S. Scrafton, A. Duckworth, & S. J. Handley. 2004. “The story of some: 
Everyday pragmatic inference by children and adults”. Canadian Journal of 
Experimental Psychology 58:2. 121-132. 
Grice, H. P. 1975. “Logic and conversation”. Syntax and semantics: Speech acts. Volume 
3 ed. by P. Cole & J. L. Morgan, 41-58. New York: Academic Press. 
Guasti, M. T., G. Chierchia, S. Crain, F. Foppolo, A. Gualmini, & L. Meroni. 2005. “Why 
children and adults sometimes (but not always) compute implicatures”. Language 
and Cognitive Processes 20. 667-696. 
de Hoop, H., & M. Kas. 1989. “Sommige betekenisaspecten van enkele kwantoren, 
oftewel: enkele betekenisaspecten van sommige kwantoren”. TTT 9:1. 31-49. 
de Hoop, H. 1992. Case configuration and noun phrase interpretation. PhD diss., 
University of Groningen. 
Jong, F. de. 1983. “Sommige niet, andere wel: de verklaring van een raadselachtig 
verschil”. Glot 6. 229-246. 
Noort, M. W. M. L. van den, M. P. C. Bosch, M. Haverkort, & K. Hugdahl. 2008. “A 
standard computerized version of the reading span test in different languages”. 
European Journal of Psychological Assessment 24:1. 35-42. 
Noveck, I. A. 2001. “When children are more logical than adults: Experimental 
investigations of scalar implicature”. Cognition 78. 165-188. 
Papafragou, A. & J. Musolino. 2003. “Scalar implicatures: Experiments at the semantics-
pragmatics interface”. Cognition 86. 253-282. 
Pouscoulous, N., I. A. Noveck, G. Politzer & A. Bastide. 2007. “A developmental 
investigation of processing costs in implicature production”. Language Acquisition 
14:4. 347-375. 
 
